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The life cycle of a cluster: some hypotheses
Authors such as G. M. P. Swann and E. Bergman have defended the hy-
pothesis that clusters have a life cycle.2 During their early history, clusters ben-
efit from positive feedback such as strong local suppliers and customers, a 
pool of  specialized labor, shared infrastructures and information externali-
ties. However, as clusters mature, they face growing competition in input mar-
kets such as real estate and labor, congestion in the use of  infrastructures, and 
some sclerosis in innovation. These advantages and disadvantages combine 
to create the long-term cycle. In the automobile industry, this interpretation 
can explain the rise and decline of clusters such as Detroit in the United States 
or the West Midlands in Britain.3
The objective of  this paper is to analyze the life cycle of  the Barcelona au-
tomobile- industry cluster from its origins at the end of  the nineteenth centu-
ry to today. The Barcelona district remained at the top of  the Iberian auto-
mobile clusters for a century. In 2000, when Spain had reached sixth position 
1. Earlier versions of  this paper were presented at the International Conference of  Au-
tomotive History (Philadelphia 2012), the 16th World Economic History Congress (Stellen-
bosch 2012), and the 3rd Economic History Congress of  Latin America (Bariloche 2012). I 
would like to thank the participants in the former meetings for their comments and sugges-
tions. This research benefitted from the financial support of  the Spanish Ministry of  Econo-
my (MINECO) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the projects 
HAR2012-33298 (Cycles and industrial development in the economic history of  Spain) and 
HAR2015-64769-P (Industrial crisis and productive recovery in the Spanish history). 
2. Bergman (2008); Swann (2009).
3. Swann (2009); Klepper (1996), (2010); Donnelly, Begley & Collis (2017); Walker 
(2017); Pardi (2017).
Received: September 2013
Accepted: April 2014
Revista de Historia Industrial
N.º 66. Año XXVI. 2017. Monográfico 3
16849_RHI66.indb   77 27/2/17   15:05
The Life-Cycle of the Barcelona Automobile-Industry Cluster, 1889-2015
78
in the world ranking of  producers in terms of  the number of  vehicles, Bar-
celona was still the Spanish province with the most employees in this indus-
try (about 50,000). In this paper, we aim to explain why the automotive in-
dustry succeeded in Barcelona and why its decline was less intense than that 
of  other mature districts with a similar pattern of  specialization. Four theo-
ries will be used to try to understand the relatively favorable performance of 
the industrial cluster: Marshallian external economies, the capabilities of lead-
ing firms, the adoption of  strategic or industrial policies, and district institu-
tions that are favorable to growth.
In the late nineteenth century, Marshall underlined three main advantages 
of a geographically concentrated industry. Knowledge and information are, 
partially, free in the district. Entrepreneurs can benefit from a pool of skilled 
labor and may rely on numerous subsidiary industries. Therefore, the Marshal-
lian triad of district advantages is comprised of knowledge spin-offs, the labor 
pool and specialized suppliers.4 More recently, M. Porter recovered the origi-
nal Marshallian interpretation to underpin the basis of  the competitive ad-
vantage of  territories.5 Marshallian approaches to understanding the struc-
tural transformation of  core districts of  the Industrial Revolution in both 
Britain and America were adopted by J. Wilson, A. Popp and J. Singleton, 
and P. Scranton.6
D. Landes and A. D. Chandler insisted on the efficiency gains derived 
from firm size.7 The latter stressed the fact that, during the Second Industri-
al Revolution, the best world performers were those firms that could not only 
benefit from economies of scale in production, but also develop organization-
al capabilities in management, R&D, and marketing and distribution. How-
ever, Chandler accepted that a common feature of  all three industrial revolu-
tions was a geographically concentrated location of  profit-orientated large 
enterprises in the developed world.8 Similarly, A. Markusen focused on hub-
and-spoke districts, which she considered to be rather common in the United 
States.9 Such clusters hosted a few leading firms of  a certain size, which act-
ed as coordinators of  the district. Hub-firms, mainly of  local origin, could 
take advantage of  both internal and external economies. A more extreme po-
sition has been put forward by S. Klepper, who analyzed the formation of key 
clusters such as Detroit. According to him, the successful cluster not only 
hosts outperforming firms that dominate the industry, but is, in fact, the re-
4. Marshall (1890); Krugman (1991).
5. Porter (1990), (1998), (2000).
6. Scranton (1997); Wilson & Popp (2003); Wilson & Singleton (2003).
7. Chandler (1964); Landes (1969), (1987); Chandler (1990), (1992); Landes (1998); 
Chandler, Amatori & Hikino (eds.) (1997).
8. Chandler (2005).
9. Markusen (1996).
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sult of  abundant spin-offs from leading firms.10 Latin business historians, 
such as J. Nadal, A. Carreras and X. Tafunell, F. Amatori, J. L. Loubet, P. 
Fridenson, and D. Barjot, have also insisted in the fact that the large firm has 
performed a central role in leading economies by accumulating technological, 
organizational and distribution capabilities.11
H. J. Chang stresses the role of  politics in changing the comparative ad-
vantage for latecomers.12 He recovered the old arguments put forward by A. 
Hamilton and F. List, in favor of  government support for development and 
extended infant-industry protection. With regard to the automobile industry, 
he underlined the cases of  Japan and South Korea, which benefited from do-
mestic protection during the golden age and experienced terrific success in 
automobile production in the last quarter of  the twentieth century. His insist-
ence on the need for latecomers to adopt industrial or strategic policies and 
to depart from free trade has been shared by other authors such as S. Reich, 
A. Amsden, P. Krugman, and G. Dosi and J. Stiglitz, among others.13
The Italian authors G. Becattini, S. Brusco, A. Bagnasco, and A. Rinaldi, 
among many others, have repeatedly claimed that the flexibility provided by 
medium-small firms and the institutions that encourage cooperation within 
a district contribute considerably to success in world markets.14 From a mac-
roeconomic perspective, B. Eichengreen explained that the remarkable growth 
of  Western Europe during the second post-war golden age was due to the im-
plementation of  a set of  cooperative arrangements which made it possible for 
workers and capitalists to defer current compensation in return for future 
gains.15 M. Olson, K. H. Paqué and, more recently, D. Acemoglou and J. Rob-
inson also pointed to institutions as a key explanation of  development, even 
if  they insisted on the fact that better economic performance depended on the 
erosion of  the power of  extractive elites through market competition.16
As the automobile industry cluster of  Barcelona was formed, classical 
Marshallian externalities were created and hub-firms emerged. Infant indus-
try policies were adopted in the mid-twentieth century, but were later aban-
doned. Cluster institutions developed and a few were long-lasting. This arti-
10. Klepper (1996), (2002), (2010).
11. Nadal (1975); Nadal, Carreras & Martín Aceña (1988); Carreras & Tafunell (1993); 
Barjot (1995); Loubet (1995); Chandler, Amatori & Hikino (eds.) (1997); Amatori (1999); 
Loubet (2001); Carreras & Tafunell (2003); Amatori (2009); Fridenson (2007); Amatori & Col-
li (2011); Loubet (2011).
12. Chang (1993), (2007); Ling & Chang (2009).
13. Amsden (1989); Reich (1990); Krugman (1991); Catalan (2000); García Ruiz (2001); 
Cimoli, Dosi & Stiglitz (eds.) (2009); San Román (2010); Catalan & Fernández de Sevilla 
(2013).
14. Bagnasco (1977); Becattini (ed.) (1979); Brusco (1982); Bagnasco & Sabel (eds.) 
(1995); Rinaldi (2005); Becattini, Belandi & De Propis (eds.) (2009).
15. Eichengreen (2007).
16. Olson (1992), (1996); Paqué (1996); Acemoglou & Robinson (2012).
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cle aims to evaluate which of these factors was most decisive for the long-term 
success of  the cluster.17
Preconditions for a cluster: building cars in Barcelona, 1889-1903
In 1889, the textile entrepreneur Francesc Bonet visited the International 
Exhibition of Paris. He was so impressed by the applications of the Daimler 
engines exhibited by Panhard Levassor that he decided to bring one back to 
Barcelona, and in December 1889 Bonet patented the first automobile in 
Spain.18 He built a tricycle which incorporated the Daimler engine and rode it 
with some friends down Passeig de Gràcia, one of the main avenues of the 
Cata lan capital. Gimeno observes that Bonet imported at least three Daimler 
engines from Panhard between September 1889 and May 1890.19 From that 
moment, Bonet became Panhard’s sales agent in Spain. As the manufacturer 
of the first vehicle powered by a combustion engine, the cotton industrialist is 
usually referred to as the pioneer of the Iberian automotive industry.
Another entrepreneur established in Catalonia was the Valencian lieuten-
ant Emili La Cuadra, and La Cuadra also visited the Paris International Ex-
hibition. He was working with electric engines, and had opened a plant in 
Lleida to generate hydroelectricity. During the 1890s, the growing interest in 
international racing competitions convinced La Cuadra that the motor indus-
try was going to define the future of  manufacturing. He sold his Lleida plant 
and transferred to Barcelona in September 1898 to create the Compañía Gene-
ral de Coches y Automóviles E. La Cuadra. There he began by building elec-
tric cars, helped by D. Tamaro, with somewhat disappointing initial results. 
Later, La Cuadra and Tamaro began to build automobiles using combustion 
engines and contacted a bright young Swiss engineer named M. Birkigt. La 
Cuadra also became Benz’s sales agent in Barcelona. Thanks to 21-year-old 
Birkigt’s formidable skills as an engine-designer, La Cuadra was able to build 
at least five gasoline-powered automobiles in 1900. 
La Cuadra went bankrupt during the general strike of  1901. One of  his 
creditors was Vic railway head J. Castro, who found financial support in the 
latter town to create J. Castro en Comandita, Fábrica Hispano Suiza de Au-
tomóviles. The new company acquired the works of  La Cuadra and contin-
ued using Birkigt for its designs; but although it opened new premises in Bar-
celona, it was unable to sell more vehicles than La Cuadra had done.
17. This set of  hypotheses was already advanced in Catalan (2013). 
18. De Castro (1964); Ciuró (1970); Gimeno (1993).
19. Gimeno (1993).
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None of  the three pioneering firms established in Barcelona built more 
than a few cars but each contributed to generating technological innovations 
of  different kinds. Bonet’s first car featured an imported single-cylinder en-
gine. Twelve years later and with Birkigt’s help, Castro was building automo-
biles powered by the company’s own engines, some of  which carried as many 
as four cylinders. 
We can use the number of  national brands as an indicator of  the degree 
of  development of  the automobile industry at the turn of  the century. At that 
time there were more than 200 manufacturers in the United States, even 
though the size of  the US domestic market was not comparable to any of  the 
European countries. France and Britain were manufacturing over 100 brands 
each. Germany, the industry’s pioneer and the country where the early mov-
ers were already benefiting from scale economies, had 35 car manufacturers. 
As the first continental country to engage in industrialization and major steel 
production, Belgium came next with some 27 firms. After Belgium followed 
Italy, Switzerland and Austria, the most developed countries on the Europe-
an periphery, each with about ten companies. Finally, there were Australia 
and the Netherlands, each with between five and ten.
In sharp contrast to the pattern in Western Europe, the number of  man-
ufacturers in Spain could only be compared to the Scandinavian periphery 
(even while Spain’s population was obviously much larger than the popula-
tions of  Sweden or Denmark). On the other hand, production levels in Spain 
were slightly higher than they were in Portugal, the Slav and Balkan coun-
tries, or Asia and Latin America (none of  which are listed in Table 1). In gen-
eral terms, therefore, we can say that in 1901 the Spanish automotive indus-
try was performing at a much lower level than the industries in the countries 
which led the first and second technological revolutions, but that at the same 
time certain notable initiatives were being taken.
TABLE 1 ▪ Ranking of world manufacturers in 1901 (number of brands) 
Number % Number %
1 United States 215 35.2  8 Austria 8 1.3
2 France 167 27.3  9 Australia 7 1.1
3 United Kingdom 112 18.3 10 Netherlands 6 1.0
4 Germany 35 5.7 11 Canada 4 0.7
5 Belgium 27 4.4 12 Sweden 4 0.7
6 Italy 11 1.8 13 Spain 4 0.7
7 Switzerland 9 1.5 14 Denmark 3 0.5
Source: Own work from De Castro (1964).
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With regard to these initiatives it should be noted that even if  just four 
brands was rather a poor record for an economy of 19 million inhabitants, 
most of  them actually came from just one part of  the country: Barcelona, 
with its population of  0.5 million people, and Catalonia, the region of  which 
Barcelona was the capital city, with a population of some 2 million. That 75% 
of Spain’s new manufacturers should have emerged from this one city, at least 
up until 1901, suggests something of  Barcelona’s promise at the time as a lo-
cation for the future development of  a cluster. 
Moreover, two new brands launched in Barcelona by local car manufac-
turers were Bons and Ultramovil, both created in 1902.20 Later there was 
Fenix, which La Cuadra’s one-time associate Tamaro used to launch a new ve-
hicle. Under the name of that mythological bird, Tamaro is reported to have 
created a network to distribute cars with engines that could produce up to 
30 hp, but we still do not know if  any vehicles were actually built. The Fenix 
project ended in 1904. Both Castro and Tamaro can be considered as spin-offs 
of La Cuadra. Either way, Klepper’s hypothesis about the origins of success-
ful clusters does seem to fit with Barcelona’s experience at this early stage.21
Critical mass: externalities, hub-firms and institutions, 1904-1925
In 1904 a group of Catalan entrepreneurs led by D. Mateu and M. Birkigt 
founded La Hispano Suiza Fábrica de Automóviles S. A..22 Hispano Suiza can 
be considered as one of La Cuadra’s start-ups but its greater success, support-
ed by key figures in Barcelona’s financial elite, qualifies it for Markusen’s defi-
nition as a hub-firm and as the leading company in the district.23 In 1908 His-
pano Suiza had already built 200 20- to 40-hp engines. Given the low demand 
for private transport in relatively underdeveloped Spain, the firm supported 
the creation of  coach companies using Hispano vehicles. In 1910 there were 
already 30 coach lines comprising 64 vehicles built by Hispano Suiza. The 
combustion engines designed by Birkigt were particularly light and long-last-
ing, and as early as 1907 the firm was already exporting patents.
The premises of  Hispano Suiza were located in the neighborhood of La 
Sagrera in Barcelona. In its first days, Hispano Suiza’s growth was hampered 
by the scarcity of  qualified technicians and car workers, the lack of  special-
ized suppliers and the constant labor conflicts in the Catalan capital. Most 
of  all, however, Hispano Suiza faced the problem that the demand for luxury 
20. Gimeno (1993).
21. Klepper (2002), (2010).
22. De Castro (1964); Ciuró (1970); Gimeno (1993); Nadal & Tafunell (1992); Polo 
(1994); Lage (2003); Nadal (2004), (2006), (2010).
23. Markusen (1996).
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automobiles was limited in Spain, a poor and chiefly agrarian country. In or-
der to increase its demand, the company created an agency in Paris in 1911 
and two years later it began to build a new plant in Bois de Colombes, on the 
outskirts of  the French capital.
At the outbreak of  World War I, Birkigt began to work on the design of 
an aircraft engine and in early 1915 presented the new V-shaped engine, which 
produced over 150 hp. As Nadal has underlined, this engine contained far 
fewer parts and was much lighter than the Benz engines used by the German 
planes.24 The Birkigt engine could run without stopping for 50 hours and, as 
a result, it won its first order from the French government. Its terrific success 
in air fronts not only expanded production of  Hispano Suiza’s plants in Bar-
celona and Paris but led to applications for its patent by major companies all 
over the world. During the war, the Hispano Suiza engine was being manu-
factured by 15 factories in France, three in the US, three in Italy, one in Brit-
ain and one in Japan. Among these, the companies which manufactured 
Birkigt’s aircraft engine were Peugeot, Wright and Mitsubishi. More than 
40,000 Hispano Suiza aircraft engines were built all over the word. And His-
pano Suiza’s profits rocketed, as Chart 1 shows.
24. Nadal (2010).
CHART 1 ▪ Real profits of La Hispano Suiza S.A., 1905-1944 (1929 pesetas, 3 years 
moving averages)
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The second hub-firm in the Barcelona district in the period before the 
Spanish Civil War was Elizalde, which was considerably smaller than Hispano 
Suiza.25 Born in Spanish Cuba, A. Elizalde was Delahaye’s Spanish sales 
agent. He opened his first automobile workshop in Barcelona in 1909. Pro-
duction expanded slowly, under different society names and with different 
partners, and Elizalde manufactured crankshafts, valves, differentials, gears, 
bumpers and other parts.26 In 1913, the firm presented its first car built in Bar-
celona and the car made the 600-kilometre trip between the Catalan capital 
and Madrid in 13 hours. The outbreak of  World War I delayed the commer-
cial launch of  the new cars, which required imported parts from Belgium. 
Nevertheless, in 1915 the Fábrica Española de Automóviles Elizalde was found-
ed and the company built automobiles and their engines until 1927. The first 
Elizalde engines were incorporated in Victoria cars, first assembled in Ma-
drid, by Talleres Franco-Españoles, and later in England, by Gwynne Cars. In 
1917 Elizalde also designed two 220-hp and 150-hp aircraft engines. 
Elizalde tried to imitate Hispano Suiza in its bid for luxury cars and air-
craft engines, but had less competitive success. It launched a series of  15-, 20- 
and 25-hp engines and even one 180-hp model. This last model, an 8-cyclinder 
colossus, was built into the Elizalde 48, which at a body length of  5.7 meters 
was advertised in 1921 as the biggest car in the world. But although its engine 
featured additional technical innovations, the main drawback of  the Elizalde 
48 was its price and at 60,000 pesetas it cost much more than other cars be-
ing sold in Spain, such as the Ford models that could be bought for around 
10,000 pesetas.
In the period leading up to 1921, a series of other firms tried to enter the 
sector, following first in the footsteps of Hispano Suiza and later, and more dis-
creetly, in the steps of Elizalde. The years 1907-08 saw the emergence of the two 
new manufacturers Catalonia and Victoria. Later, a new surge of initiatives 
preceding the outbreak of World War I led to the creation of the cycle car man-
ufacturer David and of the Abadal company (which had begun production in 
Belgium, where steel could be provided much more cheaply than in Spain, but 
which then moved to Barcelona as a result of wartime pressure).27
During World War I the import of  vehicles from belligerent countries was 
blocked and this further encouraged the construction of  artisanal cars by 
modest entrepreneurs, even though some of these models lasted less than a 
single year on the market. In 1915 three new brands were launched in Barce-
lona, the most important being D y G (Díaz y Grillo) and Ideal (Talleres 
Hereter). Two years later there were a total of  five new brands, led by España 
25. De Castro (1964); Ciuró (1970); Gimeno (1993).
26. Catalan (2006a).
27. Gimeno (1993).
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(manufactured by Fábrica Nacional de Automóviles F. Batlló S. C.). All in all, 
eleven new automobile brands were created in Barcelona during the period 
1914-18.
During the 1920s the creation of  new automobile brands in the Barcelo-
na cluster generally went into decline. In the middle of  the decade, Spain was 
importing about 14,000 units per year, mainly from the US and France and 
led by Ford and Citroën respectively. The capacity of  the leading Spanish 
firms in the sector (with Hispano Suiza in first place) stood below 2,000 ve-
hicles (including cars and trucks). Elizalde could supply less than 100 vehicles 
per year, and increasingly directed its production resources to the manufac-
ture of  aircraft engines. During this decade, the remaining manufacturers 
rarely produced more than 20 vehicles each.28
The competition created by the biggest mass producers (led by Ford) 
proved to be disruptive for the emerging cluster of  Barcelona during this pe-
riod. Not only did the artisan producers tend to disappear, but the profitabil-
ity of  the local hub-firms also suffered. This was seen, for example, in His-
pano Suiza’s declining profits (incidentally, that company’s French branch 
had been detached from the original company because of  heavy taxation in 
Paris on the wartime earnings of  foreign firms29) (see Chart 1).
According to Lebrancón, it was cheaper for the Ford Motor Company to 
ship its cars to the European continent in parts.30 When examining locations 
28. San Román (1999), (2010).
29. Nadal (2006), (2010).
30. Lebrancón (2009).
CHART 2 ▪ New manufacturers in the Barcelona automobile-industry cluster, 1889-1970
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in Spain where the final assembly of  its vehicles could be made, the company 
originally opted for Cadiz rather than the Catalan capital because of  the per-
ceived danger of  Barcelona’s militant working class. Ford began to operate in 
the Cadiz free-trade zone in 1920 and its original plan was to assemble around 
5,000 vehicles a year in Andalusia. But during the first year of  activity only 
1,132 units were assembled and in 1923 Ford decided to move to Barcelona.31 
Ford’s decision can be interpreted as proof of  the advantages of  locating 
within an industrial district, even for the firm which had the most advanced 
production capabilities at that moment. Barcelona not only benefited from a 
similar free-trade zone to Andalusia but could already provide the classical 
Marshallian externalities which did not exist in Cadiz: a trained labor force, 
parts suppliers and non-codified knowledge of  the automotive industry.32 Af-
ter their unsatisfactory results in Cadiz, the American automobile giant in 
some way concluded that the advantages offered by Barcelona (an emerging 
cluster in its first years) would compensate for whatever drawbacks this city 
had in the supply of  key inputs.
If  the established firms in the cluster were mainly of  local origin in the pe-
riod up to 1923, from the moment when Ford established itself  in Barcelona 
and beyond that moment competition intensified. The structure of  the clus-
ter in the mid-1920s was that of  a district led by three hub-firms: two of lo-
cal origin, and one subsidiary of  a multinational which was in turn the indus-
try’s international leader. In terms of  manpower, Hispano Suiza was the 
district’s main hub-firm, followed at some distance by Elizalde. Nevertheless, 
every year the American company assembled several times the number of  au-
tomobiles that Hispano-Suiza could produce. In addition, there were craft 
manufacturers who tended to disappear within a few years. The growing com-
petition created by Ford and imports from other mass producers also led 
Elizalde to give up automobile production and turn instead to aircraft en-
gines.33 Even Hispano Suiza experienced a significant decrease in profits dur-
ing the second half  of  the decade (Chart 1).
In spite of  the cluster’s increasing inability to compete with mass produc-
ers, there was notable institutional development. Riding on the shoulders of 
the Industrial Revolution, Barcelona benefited from the work of  three influ-
ential institutions that were bringing structural change to the sector: the 
Chamber of  Commerce, the School of  Labor and the School of  Industrial 
Engineering. The last of  these three had been financed by the local bourgeoi-
sie and by the government at municipal and provincial levels, and was the only 
31. Wilkins & Hill (1964); Echevarría & Voltes (1990); Nadal & Tafunell (1992); Cata-
lan (1992); Estapé (1997); Catalan (2000); Lebrancón (2009).
32. Marshall (1890).
33. De Castro (1964); Ciuró (1970); Estapé (1997); San Román (1999); Catalan (2006a); 
San Román (2010).
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school of  its kind to survive the bankruptcy of  late-nineteenth century Spain. 
The Chamber of  Commerce and the School of  Labor did not specifically ca-
ter to the automotive industry but the Chamber supported industrial protec-
tion and the School of  Industrial Engineering trained future entrepreneurs 
and qualified technicians. For its part, the School of  Labor had already cre-
ated a department for machinists back in 1907. And finally, the district had 
also created its own specific institutions.
Amongst these was the Royal Automobile Club of  Catalonia (RACC), 
created in 1906.34 In 1913 the RACC held its first Barcelona automobile show, 
where in addition to the products of  Hispano-Suiza, Elizalde and other lux-
ury manufacturers, the Ford T was presented. Three years later the Associa-
tion of Automobile Manufacturers’ Unions of Barcelona (CSAB) was found-
ed to defend the interests of  car, motorcycle, bicycle and auto part producers. 
In 1919, the CSAB institutionalized the international car show by hosting the 
First Automobile Exhibition of  Barcelona. The show exhibited the products 
of  58 firms, both Spanish and foreign. In 1921 the CSAB was recognized by 
the International Permanent Bureau of Automobile Manufacturers (BPICA). 
The same year saw the creation of  the Spanish Confederation of  Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Unions (CECSA), based in Barcelona. During the years of 
1922, 1924 and 1925, the car show opened its doors again, with the editions 
of  1924 and 1925 being held during the regime of  Miguel Primo de Rivera. 
In 1925, the Fourth Automobile Exhibition of  Barcelona hosted 408 differ-
ent firms, all advertising their products.
Search for a survival strategy, 1926-52
During the 1920s, the Barcelona automotive cluster was already generat-
ing the classical Marshallian externalities of  the industrial district, which led 
Ford to change its mind and transfer its assembly lines from Cadiz to the Ca-
talan city. In addition, the cluster also benefited from the emergence of  both 
hub-firms and specific district institutions, which might have facilitated the 
successful development of  local mass production. Nevertheless, whereas 
Spanish automobile imports were already above 16,000 vehicles a year in 
1926, the Barcelona cluster did not show itself  capable of  manufacturing a 
comparable number of  vehicles until 1958. So much delay might be interpret-
ed as a significant weakness in the cluster’s first take-off  stage. Therefore, at 
the end of  the 1920s Spain began to design a strategic policy to support the 
development of  its automotive industry.
34. Pernau, Del Arco & Arias (2006).
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In 1926, General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s regime created the Official 
Committee on the Motor Industry (COMA), following the advice of  a peti-
tion signed by D. Mateu, A. Elizalde and leading Basque industrialist, R. de 
la Sota, as well as the conclusions of  the First Motor and Automobile Na-
tional Congress.35 Coma was created to ensure that government agencies 
would buy Spanish cars and to grant additional incentives to favor domestic 
production. In 1927 the Automobile Industry Protection Act restricted such 
benefits to firms whose assembled vehicles were made of  parts that were at 
least 50% of Spanish origin. The Committee also planned to introduce a sys-
tem of classification in which local producers would be identified in any of 
three groups: luxury, middle-range and economic vehicle production. 
According to Estapé, some of Coma’s proposals contributed to the begin-
nings of  the industrial policy adopted much later by Juan Antonio Suanzes, 
the first president of the public holding Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), 
created by Franco in 1941.36 However, the financial funds allocated under Pri-
mo de Rivera were not enough to induce local manufacturers to increase the 
scale of their plants. According to San Román, local firms only received Coma 
orders for 200 cars (plus 100 motorcycles) during 1927 and 1928, and the re-
sults of  the policy for local producers in the Barcelona cluster were not very 
significant:37 Elizalde decided to permanently give up automobile production 
in 1927 and to focus its efforts on aircraft engines instead, and Hispano Suiza 
never tried to go into mass production, even while it maintained its hegemo-
ny in the luxury automobile market. Moreover, the various industrial projects 
launched by craft producers to build automobiles in Barcelona were not eco-
nomically successful either. For instance, the fifth biggest manufacturer in 
1926 was the firm founded by the bright Catalan engineer, W. Ricart, who 
launched his first cars with his own 4- and 6-cylinder engine design. But with 
35. Estapé (1997). 
36. Estapé (1997).
37. San Román (1999), (2010).
TABLE 2 ▪ Leading firms in the Barcelona automotive-industry cluster (by number of 
employees) 
1926 1950c
Hispano Suiza 2,250 Enasa 3,078
Elizalde 393 Eucort* 432
Ford Motor Co. 302 Clúa 360
España 165 Ford Motor Ibérica 272
Ricart 128 Artés de Arcos 200
Note: Figure for Eucort is estimated. Sources:  Own work from Echevarría & Voltes (1990), Catalan (1992) and 
Catalan (2012).
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barely over 100 employees in 1926 he could not benefit from appreciable scale 
economies and tried to survive by merging with the fourth biggest firm, Bat-
lló, which was not much bigger than Ricart’s firm anyway. And when Batlló 
and Ricart merged to create Industria Nacional Metalúrgica (APTA) in 1928, 
this spin-off  was no more successful than the previous ventures had been.
In 1928, Henry Ford approved a plan for Europe which involved build-
ing a huge new plant in Dagenham, near London, which would supply the 
assembly plants on the European continent. According to Tolliday, this plan 
forecasted yearly sales of  15,000 units of  the Model Y in the Iberian Penin-
sula.38 The Spanish subsidiary was transformed into Ford Motor Ibérica 
(FMI) in 1929 and, as with the rest of  Dearborn’s interests in Europe, 40% 
of  the capital was allowed to remain in the hands of  local shareholders. Ac-
cording to Lebrancón, the volume of  assembled cars in the tariff-free zone 
of  Barcelona rose from 1,995 tons in 1927 to 14,764 tons in 1929. Most of 
this output went to the Spanish market but 3,442 tons were also exported to 
Italy, 1,085 tons to Portugal and 1,165 tons to North Africa.39 Consequent-
ly, the number of  employees in Ford’s plant in Barcelona rose from 302 in 
1926 to 494 in 1929.40
At the beginning of  the Great Depression in the 1930s, Spain’s serious 
problems with its foreign balance forced the country to raise tariffs and intro-
duce import quotas for many products, including automobiles. In April 1931, 
the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed. Before the end of  the year, the 
Republican government had approved legislation establishing tariff  rebates 
on imports of  automobile parts when and where an increasing share of  do-
mestic components was incorporated in cars assembled in Spain. This policy 
encouraged the use of  local components in Barcelona’s Ford Motor Ibérica 
assembly plant. Before the outbreak of  the Spanish Civil War, roughly half  
the components the American subsidiary was using to assemble automobiles 
and trucks in the Barcelona district were local products, including tires, bat-
teries, axles, wheels and glass. According to Estapé, the company employed 
750 people in July 1936 and about 2,500 employees of  the auto parts indus-
try worked exclusively for the Barcelona production plant.41 Many years ago 
now, Wilkins and Hill observed that on the eve of  the Civil War, Motor Ibéri-
ca was actually one of  Ford’s most profitable European subsidiaries.42
Moreover, the Barcelona district eventually attracted the main rival of  the 
Dearborn colossus, General Motors (GM). Like Ford, GM had also chosen 
Andalusia as the first headquarters for its Spanish subsidiary, in the mid-
38. Tolliday (2003); Lebrancón (2009).
39. Lebrancón (2009).
40. Echevarría & Voltes (1990).
41. Estapé (1997).
42. Wilkins & Hill (1964); Catalan (1992).
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1920s. Later, in 1927, General Motors Peninsular (GMP) moved from Mála-
ga to the Spanish capital, Madrid. Finally, in 1932, it moved once again, this 
time to Barcelona. The company rented premises in the tariff-free zone of  the 
Catalan city and assembled Chevrolets and other GM models there until 
1936. On the eve of  the Civil War, the subsidiary of  the firm led by Alfred 
Sloan designed a plan to build a new plant in Barcelona that would be able 
to assemble 20,000 vehicles a year and export 70% of its output.43
The paradox of  the Barcelona cluster during the 1920s and early 1930s 
was that the district developed even while local car manufacturers declined. 
The last attempts to create national brands were promoted in 1929 with Pes-
cara and in 1935 with Rubí and Sitjes, but they met with no better luck than 
their predecessors. The contrast between Hispano-Suiza and its American ri-
vals was pronounced: in 1934 the local hub-firm manufactured little more 
than a few hundred automobiles, while Barcelona’s American subsidiaries as-
sembled over 12,000 vehicles. 
In spite of  the poor performance of  local manufacturers, suppliers of 
both auto parts and of  the labor force expanded and institutions evolved. 
Around 1935, there were no fewer than 4,000 people employed in the produc-
tion of  automobiles and their parts in the Barcelona cluster. During the Re-
publican years, the Barcelona Automobile Exhibition opened its doors twice, 
in 1933 for its sixth edition and then in 1935 for its seventh. 
43. Catalan (1992); San Román (1995), (1999).
CHART 3 ▪ Real profits of Ford Motor Ibérica (1935 pesetas)
!
 Source: Own work from Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades Anónimas, various years. 
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The outbreak of  the Civil War paralyzed both Ford’s and GM’s plans for 
expanding their Barcelona subsidiaries. Hispano-Suiza and Elizalde, like all 
the local firms with more than 100 employees, were collectivized and their ac-
tivities re-directed to the production and repair of  war material. GM workers 
attempted to manufacture a number of  trucks and coaches under the brand 
Maratón but the lack of  raw materials and parts made the task nearly impos-
sible.44 Ford’s plant also focused on producing trucks and army demand, with 
similarly poor results: Ford Motor Ibérica’s monthly production dropped 
from 300 vehicles in January 1936 to only 34 in January 1937.45
The war ended on 1 April 1939 with the victory of  General Franco. Both 
GM and the Fiat-related SIAT submitted proposals to the new government 
to build assembly plants in industrialized parts of  Spain (basically in Catalo-
nia and the Basque Country).46 But neither company was allowed to proceed 
in the early years of  the new fascist regime. In fact, since 1937 the nationalist 
officers had already been making plans to promote an autarkic automotive 
industry.47 The original idea was to begin by building a factory to manufac-
ture light trucks in Seville, a city that had been controlled by the rebel army 
since July 1936. After his escape from revolutionary Catalonia and through-
out the war period, Hispano Suiza’s main shareholder M. Mateu ran the com-
pany Hispano Aviación in Seville, repairing aircraft engines for Franco and 
the forces allied to him. 
At the end of  1939 Franco’s Ministry of  Industry passed a law limiting 
the maximum stake of foreign capital in Spanish manufacturing firms to 25%. 
During 1940 a call to subsidize automobile investments, in which SIAT par-
ticipated, was finally cancelled.48 In September 1941 the public holding Insti-
tuto Nacional de Industria was created to promote autarkical firms. Its first 
president J. A. Suanzes was one of  Franco’s former colleagues and as an en-
thusiastic supporter of  autarky he was decidedly against the acceptance of 
foreign capital.49 Suanzes blocked further proposals by SIAT, who had sought 
to build a new production plant in the Basque Country or Catalonia with Fi-
at’s technological support. And already in 1942 the INI presidency had de-
cided to buy land in Madrid in order to establish the production of  automo-
biles there.50 At the end of  World War II, INI made an offer to the engineer 
W. Ricart, who had spent seven years in Arese, Italy, as assistant production 
head of  Alfa Romeo: the Spanish public holding would build a large factory 
44. Ciuró (1970).
45. Echevarría & Voltes (1990).
46. Catalan (1992); San Román (1999); Tappi (2008).
47. San Román (1995); Estapé (1997); San Román (1999); Carreras & Estapé (2002).
48. San Román (1995), (1999); Tappi (2008).
49. San Román (1995), (1999).
50. Catalan (2006a).
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in Madrid to produce light trucks and Ricart would supervise the operation. 
According to Nadal, Suanzes wanted to strengthen his project by using the 
Hispano Suiza plant in Barcelona for the construction of  heavy trucks. The 
old Barcelona hub-firm had struggled during World War II under the burden 
of  financing too many different types of  production, from aircraft engines 
and canons to heavy trucks and engine-machines.51 Finally, in 1946, and un-
der pressure from Suanzes, M. Mateu decided to sell the Barcelona factory to 
INI, which created the Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENASA). 
The creation of  this completely state-owned firm can be considered as the 
clearest outcome of early Francoist policy with regard to the motor industry. 
Enasa began by building heavy trucks in Hispano-Suiza’s former premises in 
Barcelona while the new modern plant was being built in Madrid.52 
At the end of  Civil War, as GM was denied permission to expand its Bar-
celona plant, it refused to continue assembling in Spain. Although this did 
not happen to Ford Motor Ibérica, the Dearborn subsidiary was granted very 
few licenses to import parts and assemble its cars, with the result that the Bar-
celona plant focused its efforts on the production of trucks and parts53. It also 
provided inputs to new craft manufacturers such as the trolley builder Au-
tarquía. The scarcity of  steel and other metals and the fall in imports com-
bined to cause marked underutilization of  capacity. In fact, FMI employee 
numbers dropped from 540 in 1935 to 293 in 1942. According to Estapé, Fran-
co’s government tried to force Ford to relinquish two thirds of  the capital of 
its Spanish subsidiary to local shareholders and to build a new plant in 
Navarre rather in Barcelona.54 However, these proposals were not accepted 
by the American company, whose Spanish investment never completely re-
covered from the Spanish Civil War. 
In the mid-1940s, FMI presented a plan to manufacture the Fordson trac-
tor in exchange for permission to import cars, but negotiations with the Min-
istry of Industry did not lead to any final agreements. The upside was that as 
imports of parts were so scarce, the Ford subsidiary’s use of local materials sig-
nificantly increased. If 39% of the weight of a truck built in 1939 was composed 
of local materials, this proportion had increased to 76% by 1945. But at that 
moment Ford directly employed fewer than 300 people.55 As Wilkins and Hill 
have observed, by July of 1946 all Ford’s subsidiaries in Europe had reinitiated 
production except the Spanish and the German plants.56 Moreover, between 
1945 and 1949 Barcelona’s production of Ford trucks was also very disappoint-
51. Nadal (2010).
52. López Carrillo (1998).
53. Estapé (1997); Carreras & Estapé (2002); Estapé (2003).
54. Estapé (2003).
55. Estapé (1997), (2003).
56. Wilkins & Hill (1964).
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ing, with less than 1,000 vehicles constructed, and in the period after the Civil 
War Ford Motor Ibérica’s real profits never reached the 1935 level (Chart 3). 
There was some improvement in the early 1950s, when the availability of raw 
materials and parts significantly increased, but Ford decided to sell some of its 
less profitable European subsidiaries. The former Spanish subsidiary, under to-
tally domestic control since 1954, became Motor Ibérica (MI).
The severe scarcity of  means of transport in autarkic Spain led many Bar-
celona entrepreneurs to launch projects to produce motorcycles, automobiles 
and parts. The question of  motorcycles is not addressed this article, but with 
regard to passenger cars, the most notable example of  these initiatives was 
Eucort, the firm which was created by E. Cortés in 1945 and which remained 
in business until 1953.57 In 1948 Eucort produced 148 vehicles, but the series 
were so short that the firm could not survive much longer.
Because both imported and domestically produced cars were not easily 
available, the demand for parts substantially increased. Around 1950, the 
third biggest cluster producer in terms of  manpower was probably J. Clúa, a 
firm which manufactured engine heads and blocks for trucks and for passen-
ger cars (see Table 2). Clúa himself  was a former Hispano Suiza worker who 
had also been employed by the bus manufacturer Roca, where he’d begun to 
work in the production of  diesel engines. Other significant firms manufactur-
ing auto parts in the cluster before the 1950s were Auto Electricidad (petrol 
pumps and distributors), Artés de Arcos (lights and command instruments), 
Fundiciones Industriales (cylinders), Harry Walker (carburetors) and Soler 
Almirall (ball bearings). In 1950 and as Catalan business picked up, the Bar-
celona district already housed 131 factories and workshops manufacturing 
automobile parts.58
However, Franco’s early autarkic policy radically transformed the hub-
firms of  the Barcelona automotive cluster: the first, Hispano Suiza was con-
verted into a second-class plant depending on the state-owned ENASA; and 
Ford’s subsidiary became a completely Spanish private firm which did not 
have its own technology and which would instead produce light commercial 
vehicles and tractors for farming. Barcelona not only lost the world-renowned 
brand of  quality car that Hispano Suiza had become, it did not achieve mass 
automobile production either. In 1950 only 637 automobiles were produced 
in the whole of  Spain. Spain’s position in the world ranking of  car manufac-
turers fell from fifteenth in 1928 to eighteenth in 1950. 
At the end of  the 1940s, the failure of  the autarkic project forced an 
about-turn in Franco’s industrial policies. The year of  1948 was a turning 
point for the automotive industry, with the INI finally approving the use of 
57. Ciuró (1970); San Román (1995), (1999).
58. Catalan & Monteagudo (2003).
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Fiat’s technology to build a new factory to manufacture cars in Barcelona’s 
tariff-free zone, the Zona Franca.59 The first promoter was the private invest-
ment bank Banco Urquijo, which was forced to accept that 51% of the capi-
tal of  the manufacturing firm would remain in the hands of  INI. The Insti-
tuto also succeeded in obtaining Fiat’s technological support to build not just 
an assembly line but a complete manufacturing plant. Fiat, however, did not 
grant permission for the export of  its licensed products from Barcelona. 
The Sociedad Española de Automóviles de Turismo S.A. (SEAT) was final-
ly created in 1950. The private shareholders subscribed 49% of the capital, 
with 7% stakes each for Banco Urqujio, Banco Hispano Americano, Banco 
de Bilbao, Banco de Vizcaya, Banco Español de Crédito, Banco Central and 
Fiat. While most of  the banks placed Seat’s shares among their Spanish cus-
tomers, Banco Urquijo, Fiat and INI remained as the strategic shareholders. 
Moreover, the Spanish government also supported Seat by granting it the 
right to expropriate the land where the new plant was to be built, and allow-
ing the company benefits associated with firms of  ‘national interest’, which 
basically meant its exemption from the main forms of  domestic taxation. 
Moreover, in 1952 SEAT obtained permission to import parts and equipment 
with tariff  exemption, provided that 50% of its output would derive from lo-
cal origin. In order to grant this permission, the government had to override 
certain autarkic policies and return to the legislation of  the Republican years. 
In this sense, the end of  Franco’s autarky came hand-in-hand with the partial 
recovery of  the 1930s policy of  promoting local auto part production.60
Renaissance and golden age under industrial policy, 1953-72
Spanish industrial policy during the 1950s sought not only to produce cars 
but to employ mostly local parts to do so.61 The first model manufactured by 
SEAT, the 40-hp 1400, was released in late 1953. During 1954, the first year 
of  normal production, already 60% of the parts of  the vehicles manufactured 
in Barcelona’s Zona Franca were of  local origin. The bodies, oil pumps and 
a few other components were still imported from Torino, but the rest of  the 
vehicle was manufactured in Spain, mainly in the Barcelona district.62 
The promotion of  local manufacturing meant that very few licenses were 
being granted to import either vehicles or auto parts. Scarcity was so acute 
59. San Román (1999); Catalan (2006a); Tappi (2008).
60. Catalan (2006a). 
61. Catalan (2000); García Ruiz (2001); Sánchez (2004), (2006); Fernández de Sevilla 
(2007); Catalan (2010); Ortiz Villajos (2010); Fernández de Sevilla (2011); Sánchez (2011); Cat-
alan & Fernández de Sevilla (2013).
62. Catalan (2006a), (2010).
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that a new surge of  initiatives both in manufacturers and component produc-
ers took place. It is easier to quantify the birth of  new brands than the en-
trance of  new auto parts manufacturers, but both experienced major expan-
sion during the mid-1950s (Chart 2). The peak in the entrance of  craft 
producers, who specialized in the manufacture of  microcars, took place 
around 1955. Some of the most famous brands manufactured in Catalonia 
during these years were Aleu, Clúa, Biscuter, Jorsa and Ausa. These brands 
were rarely manufactured in series of  more than 100 units but they contrib-
uted to the renaissance of the Barcelona cluster and became the basis of fu-
ture spin-offs. One of the most well-known is Biscuter, which was produced by 
Autonacional S.A..63 This company was founded in 1953 and employed around 
300 people. It produced a total of five micro-car models equipped with 197 cc 
engines licensed by the Villiers Engine Company. At its peak, Autonacional 
claimed it would be able to manufacture as many as 10,000 vehicles a year; but 
in the final event it closed its doors, in 1957, when it was producing about 3,000 
units annually. Since that year, the number of both established and new firms 
dramatically diminished. 
The main reason for the collapse of  new brand creation and the high mor-
tality rate of  established firms since 1957 was SEAT’s release of  the 600 Mod-
63. Ciuró (1970); Catalan (1992); García Ruiz (2001), (2003).
CHART 4 ▪ Output shares of automobiles in the Barcelona cluster 1957  
(motorbikes excluded)
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el, the first popular car mass-produced in the Barcelona district.64 With its 21-
hp engine (633 cc), the 600 Model only had half  the power of  Seat’s 1400 
Model, but its price was also nearly half  the price of  the other car (60,000 pe-
setas compared to 120,000 pesetas). In comparison to the Biscuter there was 
no possible competition: Autonacional’s car sold for about half  the Seat price 
(27,000 pesetas on average), but had less than one third of  its engine power. 
Many motorcycle manufacturers in the Barcelona district also perished after 
1957 (despite their earlier experience of  remarkable growth from the late 
1940s onwards). The Seat 600 was not only the first true ‘people’s car’ being 
manufactured in the district but 97% of its parts came from locally-produced 
materials (including the body, which was produced in the Zona Franca facto-
ry). Although the royalty fee Seat had to pay to Fiat for manufacturing the 
600 was slightly higher than the fee it had paid for its 1400 Model (about 4% 
of the vehicle’s sales price), most of  the parts were of  local origin, which was 
in line with the industrial policies of  the 1950s.
No other firm in the district recorded a success that could be compared 
to Seat’s people’s car, but the pioneer companies also prospered in the late 
1950s. In 1957 Motor Ibérica produced 404 light trucks in Barcelona under 
the Ebro brand with Ford’s licensing. Enasa manufactured 505 heavy trucks 
in the former Hispano Suiza plant under the brand Pegaso.65 Even Elizalde 
64. Solé (1994); San Román (1995); Catalan (2000); García Ruiz (2001); Catalan (2006c); 
Catalan & Fernández Sevilla (2013).
65. López Carrillo (1998); García Ruiz (2003).
CHART 5 ▪ Automobile Exhibition of Barcelona, 1919-89 (First 25 Shows)
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tried to get back into automobile production. Throughout the 1950s, Elizal-
de had been producing aircraft engines as a partially state-owned firm under 
the name of Empresa Nacional de Motores de Aviación S.A. (ENMASA), but 
in 1959 it signed a contract with Daimler Benz A.G. which licensed the Bar-
celona plant to produce diesel engines and vans with the Stuttgart company’s 
technology.66
Auto part producers also enjoyed a period of expansion during the 1950s. 
The cylinder manufacturer Fundiciones Industriales (located in Vilanova i La 
Geltrú) and the producer of ignition systems Auto Electricidad increased their 
respective labor forces to over 500 employees each. In 1953 a group of local en-
trepreneurs and the Italian firm Carello created a joint venture to produce 
lights, filters and other parts under the brand Faros Españoles S.A. (FAESSA). 
In 1958 Ricart and a group of  entrepreneurs obtained a license to produce 
hydraulic brakes under the brand Automoción S.A. In 1959 Constructora de 
Equipos Diesel (Condiesel) began to build a new plant in Sant Cugat, near 
Barcelona. The general trend during the 1950s and 1960s was licensing tech-
nology from European groups which participated with minor stakes in the 
firms. After the stabilization plan, the presence of  foreign interest increased 
because the new law permitted foreign participation in as much as 49% of a 
company’s capital.
Components producers significantly benefited from the lack of  foreign 
competition and the increasing demand from manufacturers such as Seat, 
Enasa and Motor Ibérica. They often licensed technology from European 
firms and, very often, favored their participation as minority shareholders.67 
The main companies in this group were Fundiciones Industriales, Auto Elec-
tricidad, Harry Walker, Condiesel, Artés de Arcos, Frape and Carner. Other, 
more modest part producers which experienced significant growth during the 
early 1960s, were Ficosa and Doga.68
Counting both manufacturers and auto part producers, at least 15,000 peo-
ple were employed in the Barcelona automotive industry cluster in 1960 (more 
than three times the size of the cluster in 1936). Although the Madrid auto-
motive industry had grown very quickly in the early years of Franco’s regime 
(11,000 employees) and the Basque cluster had also expanded (9,000 employ-
ees), Barcelona maintained its position as the capital of the Iberian automo-
tive industry, even while there was no real help for institutional development.69 
In fact, Seat, Enasa and Enmasa all had INI as their main shareholder but 
their headquarters were located in Madrid as a result of  the centralizing pol-
66. Catalan (2006a); García Ruiz (2003).
67. Ortiz Villajos (2010); Tudela (2016).
68. Ficosa’s history is analyzed in Catalan (2006b). Doga was born in 1958.
69. Catalan & Monteagudo (2003).
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icy of  the holding. Moreover, during the regime the Barcelona Automobile 
Exhibition was unable to open its doors until 1966, which meant that between 
its seventh and eighth editions there was a gap of  more than 30 years (an un-
usual institutional weakness). However, from then until the crisis of the 1970s, 
both the number of  exhibitors and the square meters of  exhibits increased 
dramatically (Chart 5).
If  we consider the hub-firms in the Barcelona cluster that employed more 
than 1,000 people in the early 1960s, three out of  every four firms were man-
aged from the Spanish capital. The only firm that had its headquarters in Cat-
alonia was the fully privately-owned Motor Ibérica. The cluster’s institution-
al development was therefore much less satisfactory than it had been in the 
pre-Civil War years. However, the cluster continued to benefit from Marshal-
lian externalities: technicians moved from one firm to another, the number 
and size of  auto part suppliers expanded and the cluster’s specialized labor 
force also increased. In spite of  the cluster’s institutional shortcomings, the 
externalities made it possible for the district to survive and mature.
The Barcelona experience tends to confirm Klepper’s theory on the im-
portance of  inheritance and spin-offs within automotive clusters, but with 
one notable difference:70 although three of  the four leading firms in Table 3 
were spin-offs of pioneer hub-firms in the district (Enasa from Hispano Suiza, 
Motor Ibérica from Ford and Enmasa from Elizalde), the firm that emerged 
as the new district champion, Seat, had actually grown from nothing, under 
its own steam. Seat emerged in the early 1950s and was mainly the result of 
strategic industrial policy, yet it generated the most important externalities in 
the cluster and provided the main thrust for the cluster’s revitalization. There-
fore, its experience tends to confirm the hypotheses of Chang and other schol-
ars who insisted in the need for industrial policy.71
In fact, Seat launched its 1500 Model in 1963 in order to renew its line in 
saloon vehicles, and its 850 Model in 1966, with the intention of  upgrading 
the offer for its customers.72 During 1966, Seat manufactured more than 
120,000 vehicles. When we compare this figure with the output of  the other 
hub-firms in the Barcelona district, it becomes clear that the scale economies 
derived from Seat dramatically exceeded the production capabilities of  the 
district’s older established companies: in that same year Motor Ibérica man-
ufactured just 5,772 vehicles (Ebro), Enasa’s Madrid and Barcelona plants 
together only built some 10,260 vehicles (Pegaso trucks), and Enmasa assem-
bled just 2,053 vehicles (Mercedes vans), even though this last firm also sup-
70. Klepper (1996), (2002), (2010).
71. Amsden (1989); Reich (1990); Chang (1993); Catalan (2000); Chang (2007); Ling & 
Chang (2009); Catalan (2010); Catalan & Fernández de Sevilla (2013).
72. Solé (1994); Catalan (2006c); Tappi (2008).
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plied engines for the DKW plant in Vitoria-Gasteiz, in the Basque country.73
During the 1960s Spanish industrial policy maintained strict import quotas 
on car imports and heavy protection on auto part imports.74 Although the stake 
of foreign capital permitted in Spanish industrial firms had been increased to 
49%, automobile investment was still subject to tough licensing laws. And in ad-
dition to favoring import substitution, the Ministry of Industry sought to pro-
mote manufacturing export. Minister Gregorio López Bravo urged Fiat to al-
low Zona Franca to export and an agreement was finally reached in 1967 by 
which Seat could export its vehicles from Barcelona in exchange for granting 
Fiat’s Agnelli family a larger stake in the firm’s capital: 30% (from just 7% be-
fore the agreement), while in INI’s case the share would be reduced from 51% 
accordingly. Moreover, Turin also agreed to lower the royalty fees paid on Seat’s 
models. And finally, INI’s sale of capital helped to finance the investments re-
quired to produce a new model, the 124, which was launched in 1968.
73. Echevarría & Voltes (1990); López Carrillo (1998); Catalan (2006a).
74. Catalan (2000); García Ruiz (2001), (2003); Sánchez (2004); Catalan (2006c); Sánchez 
(2006); Fernández de Sevilla (2007); Catalan (2010); Fernández de Sevilla (2011); Sánchez (2011); 
Catalan & Fernández de Sevilla (2013).
TABLE 3 ▪ Employment by leading firms and total employment in the automobile 
industry cluster of Barcelona, 1962 and 1976 
1962 1976
SEAT 5,507 SEAT 27,053
ENASA 3,696 Motor Ibérica 4,722
Motor Ibérica 1,178 ENASA 3,616
ENMASA 1,000 CHAM Benz 1,422
Fundiciones Industriales 677 Condiesel 1,130
Auto Electricidad 635 Industrias del Mediterráneo 1,124
Estampaciones Metálicas Tió 449 Fundiciones Industriales 1,012
Industrias Men-Par 334 Autoaccesorios Harry Walker 987
Artés de Arcos 332 Bendibérica 901
Faros Españoles (FAESSA) 220 FAESSA Internacional 878
13,784 42,845
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
IN THE DISTRICT 20,503
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
IN THE DISTRICT 55,131
SHARE OF 10
TOP FIRMS 0.672
SHARE OF 10
TOP FIRMS 0.777
Source: Own work from Catalan (1992) & Catalan (2012).
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During this golden age, the Barcelona district began to feel some of  the 
disadvantages of  mature clusters. Accelerated growth and diversification 
since the mid-1950s had increased the price of  land in and around the city. 
Many auto part suppliers chose to build their new factories in towns in the 
main counties surrounding Barcelona (such as Baix Llobregat and Vallès), 
where land could be more cheaply bought. Moreover, rapid industrial growth 
also prompted labor mobilization and the emergence of  a new union move-
ment which aimed to improve wages and working conditions. Because free 
trade unions had been prohibited during the regime, labor disputes very of-
ten became both economic and political. As the largest manufacturer in the 
country, Seat became the main arena for class-related confrontation, even 
though the remaining firms in the cluster also experienced increasing levels 
of  such conflict.75
As Seat grew, the company’s managers decided to solve the problem of 
cramped premises in Zona Franca by acquiring land near the town of Mar-
torell, some 30 kilometers from Barcelona but still within the same province. 
The 1969 decision to purchase this land (in an area that would eventually also 
contain a motorway connecting the Spanish Mediterranean coast to France) 
clearly indicated Seat’s desire to remain within the district, despite the clus-
ter’s growing labor conflict.76 At first, the company had planned to use this 
land to build a production plant to manufacture its latest model, the 127 (an-
other people’s car which would replace the obsolete 600 Model); but the new-
ly-appointed Minister of  Industry, José María López de Letona, denied per-
mission for building the plant (and Martorell had to wait until the early 1990s 
to get inaugurate its factory, after Seat had already come under the ownership 
of  the Volkswagen Group). In fact, the 127 Model was finally produced in 
Zona Franca, where it began to be manufactured in 1972. 
Mounting labor conflict in Zona Franca led to a strike in 1971 which end-
ed with the death of  a car worker at the hands of  the Spanish police.77 At the 
same time and in spite of  the regime’s political repression, Seat workers’ wag-
es also increased rapidly, fostered by clandestine union mobilization: the la-
bor share in total Seat costs increased from 15% in 1969 to 22% in 1972. By 
then, the company was producing more than 300,000 vehicles a year and had 
significantly helped Spain become the ninth biggest automobile manufactur-
er worldwide (Table 4). 
Motor Ibérica (MI) surpassed Enasa as the second hub-firm of the dis-
trict. In 1965 the private firm decided to take on a new technological partner, 
replacing Ford with the Canadian Massey Ferguson, who accepted a 32% rate 
75. Tappi (2008).
76. Catalan (2006c).
77. Solé (1994); Tappi (2008).
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of participation in its capital.78 MI’s growth strategy combined to expand 
within the Barcelona cluster and also took over firms in other Spanish dis-
tricts. In Montcada, on the outskirts of  Barcelona, the firm bought the lion’s 
share of the truck body manufacturer Bosuga. MI also decided to build a new 
assembly plant for both trucks and tractors in Zona Franca, close to Seat’s 
plant. During the early 1970s, MI therefore had three large factories within 
the Barcelona district. In the rest of  Spain, the company also bought large 
stakes in Avila’s producer of  vans (Fadisa), in Madrid’s Aeronáutica Indus-
trial (Avia), which manufactured vans and engines, and in the Basque auto 
parts producer Forjas de Asúa.79 In 1972 the Motor Ibérica group was pro-
ducing nearly 19,000 vehicles.
Enasa took over the van producer Sava, located in Valladolid. Although 
most of  the new employment in Enasa was generated in the light trucks 
plant in Barajas (Madrid), the state-owned firm also decided to build new 
facilities in Barcelona’s Zona Franca. Consequently, the three largest hub-
firms in the cluster eventually became neighbors in the location of  signifi-
cant plants. The Enasa group manufactured 18,000 trucks in 1972 (includ-
ing plants in Madrid, Barcelona and Valladolid). The group employed about 
11,000 people all over Spain. Barcelona’s plants accounted for 30% of  total 
employment figures. 
In 1969 Enmasa transferred its Barcelona plant, which produced Mer cedes 
vans and road vehicle engines to Cispalsa.80 Daimler Benz took the lion’s share 
in this new firm and Enmasa and another INI’s subsidiary, Endasa, participat-
ed with minor stakes. As well as Mercedes vans, Cispalsa manufactured engines 
for Vitoria’s DKW and developed a diesel engine to be assembled in Seat’s 
1500 Model. In 1972 Cispalsa merged with Imosa to create the Compañía His-
pano Alemana de Productos Mercedes-Benz y Volkswagen S.A. (Mevosa).81 
The main stakes of  the firm remained in the hands of  the German companies 
located in Stuttgart and Wolfsburg. Mevosa produced about 11,000 vehicles 
in 1972 and employed more than 1,000 people.
The auto parts manufacturers also experienced substantial growth in the 
period leading up to the early 1970s.82 For instance, Fundaciones Industriales, 
which produced alloys for pistons and other motor components, increased its 
employees from 677 in 1962 to 1,102 in the mid- 1970s; and Autoaccesorios 
Harry Walker, which manufactured carburetors, expanded its labor force from 
205 to 987 workers. 
78. Echevarría & Voltes (1990); Estapé (1997).
79. Echevarría & Voltes (1990).
80. Catalan (2006a).
81. García Ruiz (2001); Catalan & Monteagudo (2003); García Ruiz (2003).
82. Ortiz Villajos (2010).
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Like the automobile manufacturers, the auto parts producers began to ex-
perience district disadvantages in the late golden age. One of  the most serious 
strikes took place in the Harry Walker plants in 1970. Labor disputes and in-
creasing land prices in Barcelona also favored the expansion of  the industry 
to less developed municipalities within the district: Femsa, which manufac-
tured generators, batteries and electrical cables, built factories in various lo-
cations in the province of Barcelona (namely, L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Sant 
Joan Despí and Castellet i la Gornal). 
The province of  Barcelona had ten factories assembling cars during the 
1970s and about 300 plants producing parts. It had a direct labor force of 
some 55,000 people. As Table 3 shows, throughout the late golden age the rap-
id expansion of  the cluster was accompanied by an increasing concentration 
of  employment within the largest firms in the district. These provided the 
cluster with key capabilities, benefiting from scale economies in production, 
distribution and management, confirming Chandler’s thesis.83 Importantly, 
they also took advantage of  the classical Marshallian externalities that hun-
dreds of  auto part suppliers and thousands of  workers could provide.84 
83. Chandler (1964), (1990), (1992); Chandler, Amatori & Hikino (eds.) (1997); Chan-
dler (2005).
84. Marshall (1890); Catalan (2000), (2011a).
TABLE 4 ▪ Main producers of automobiles in 1950 and 1972 (thousands) 
1950 1972
1 United States 8,003 1 United States 11,271
2 United Kingdom 784 2 Japan 6,299
3 Canada 390 3 Germany FR 3,817
4 USSR 359 4 France 3,328
5 France 358 5 United Kingdom 2,329
6 Germany FR 305 6 Italy 1,840
7 Italy 129 7 Canada 1,474
8 Belgium 49 8 USSR 1,381
9 Australia 38 9 Spain 696
10 Japan 32 10 Brazil 611
11 Czechoslovakia 31 11 Australia 473
12 Sweden 17 12 Sweden 355
13 Germany DR 9 13 Argentina 269
14 Hungary 3 14 Mexico 233
15 Netherlands 1 15 Czechoslovakia 184
Source: Own work from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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Coping with maturity, 1972-2000
The growing maturity of  the Barcelona cluster coincided with the relaxa-
tion in nationalistic industrial policy by Franco’s later governments and 
Spain’s transition to democracy.85 In 1972, Henry Ford II visited the future 
head of  state Prince Juan Carlos and Franco’s second-in-command, Admiral 
Luis Carrero Blanco, to ratify a marked shift in the automobile policy which 
had been negotiated with the Spanish Ministry of  Industry, headed by López 
de Letona. On the one hand, the share of  the compulsory use of  domestic 
parts in automobile manufacturing was to be reduced from 90% to 60% for 
new passenger car assemblers. On the other hand, Ford was to be granted per-
mission to build a new plant to manufacture engines and cars in Spain, with 
the promise that it would export more than 90% of its production. 
Just months before Franco’s death in 1975, SEAT took charge of AUTHI, 
a bankrupt British Leyland subsidiary located near Pamplona. Such a deci-
sion in the middle of the first oil crisis after the Yom Kippur War had as coun-
terpart the Spanish government’s veto to having General Motors in Spain.86 
Nevertheless, this agreement was not respected by the transition governments 
of  UCD and, in the end, its European subsidiary Opel was granted permis-
sion to build a new factory, near Zaragoza, in 1979.87 The new automobile 
policy also allowed all the assemblers to import up to 60% their auto parts. 
Import quotas for vehicles were also substantially reduced and the number 
of  imported automobiles nearly tripled from 1978 to 1980 (increasing from 
28,000 to 76,000 units). Finally, restrictions on foreign investment were com-
pletely relaxed. 
The intensification of  competition in the automotive industry took place 
while the Spanish economy was experiencing a dramatic slump. Incumbents 
in the automobile industry not only recorded dramatic labor cost rises in the 
period leading up to 1977, but also had to cope with mounting inflation and 
frozen prices. Moreover, the need to curb inflation (which reached nearly 30% 
in 1977) led to the adoption of  very stringent monetary policies and income 
austerity with the Moncloa Pacts. This resulted in a dramatic increase in real 
interest rates. As many incumbents had borrowed to finance the mounting 
wage bill in the early years of  the crisis, the cost of  debt servicing rocketed.
SEAT’s losses, which had been moderate until 1977, dramatically in-
creased with the launching of  the Fiesta model by Ford.88 The latter was a 
slightly upgraded development of  the 127 model, then the blockbuster of  the 
85. García Ruiz (2001); González de la Fe (2003).
86. Catalan (2007).
87. Germán (2001).
88. Pérez Sanchó (2003); Catalan & Fernández de Sevilla (2013); Catalan (2017).
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Barcelona cluster’s main hub-firm.89 The major success of  the Ford Fiesta in 
the medium-low segment of  the Spanish market led to the multiplication of 
losses at SEAT, which was, moreover, handicapped by the cost of  financing 
substantial increases in the wage bill, legal restrictions to fire redundant labor 
force, the obligation to buy 90% of their parts from local suppliers of  inputs 
and the frozen prices of  their outputs. As a result, INI decided to invite Fiat 
to take complete control of  the company. After reaching an agreement in 
1979, mounting losses of  the Barcelona subsidiary and Fiat’s new managers’ 
preference for diversification led Turin to disinvest in Spain, bringing back 
the firm to public holding in 1980. At this time, the founding banks in Spain 
were also being faced by difficult times and SEAT entered the 1980s as a com-
pletely government-owned firm. Its output fell from about 360,000 vehicles 
in 1974 to less than 210,000 in 1981.90 
Motor Ibérica commercial vehicles sales slowed after 1974. Nevertheless, 
the company continued with its overambitious expansion plans after the first 
oil crisis. Within the Barcelona cluster, MI took a stake in the parts supplier Es-
tampaciones Metálicas Tió. In the rest of Spain, it decided to buy the foundry 
of Los Corrales de Buelna, a property formerly owned by Authi that Fiat had 
decided not to acquire. Abroad, mainly in Mediterranean countries, MI creat-
ed subsidiaries to foster its exports of Ebro vans, trucks and tractors. As the 
slump intensified in the late 1970s, MI’s profitability was increasingly squeezed. 
In 1979 Massey-Ferguson decided to sell its 36% stake to Nissan Motor. Mo-
tor Ibérica officially recorded losses in 1980 for the first time since Ford had left 
the company in 1954.91 Its output of commercial vehicles (mainly vans and light 
trucks) decreased from 29,000 in 1974 to just 18,000 in 1981. The production 
of farm tractors also experienced a dramatic reduction. 
Enasa’s demand also declined after the first oil crisis. Official losses emerged 
already in 1976 and production continued to decrease in the period leading 
up to 1981. The output of  vehicles (including all the Spanish plants) fell from 
about 20,000 in 1977 to less than 12,000 in 1981. In comparison with its main 
rival in the district, MI, the completely state-owned firm was more competi-
tive in heavy commercial vehicles, from the legacy of  the old Hispano Suiza. 
For instance, in 1981, MI produced 11,147 Ebro vans and exported more than 
10%, whereas Enasa produced 3,940 vans and exported less than 1% of these. 
In contrast, Enasa’s output of  Pegaso heavy trucks, which had been produced 
for the first time in the former Hispano-Suiza works, was 3,819 with exports 
of  35%, while the Ebro heavy truck output was only 1,037, with 22% of its 
production sold in exports. 
89. Tolliday (2003); Catalan (2010).
90. Solé (1994); González de la Fe (2003); Catalan (2011b).
91. Echevarría & Voltes (1990).
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Under the absolute control of  the public holding INI, Seat tried to deal 
with its dramatic crises by adopting a strategy mainly based on five points.92 
First, average costs were cut by reducing the size of  the labor force and by 
forcing its agencies to finance their own stocks. Second, exports were fostered 
with the development of  Seat’s own sales network in Europe (until that mo-
ment most foreign sales had been made through Fiat’s agencies). Third, the 
search for an international partner led to the signing of a collaboration agree-
ment with Volkswagen in 1982. Fourth, mounting losses, which rose to 26% 
of sales in 1983, were covered by repeatedly resorting to government subsi-
dies. And finally, a remarkable effort was made to develop new products.
Giorgetto Giugiaro, who had already conceived the Volkswagen Golf  and 
the Hyundai Poni, was hired to design a new Seat model for the low-medium 
segment.93 Porsche was contracted to conceive the engine. As Fiat objected to 
Giugiaro’s participation on the project, the final development was made by 
Karmann. The three companies worked together with the Martorell R&D 
center, which was built on the land bought by Seat in 1969. The new model 
was launched in 1984 under the name “Ibiza”. The successive versions of  the 
92. Catalan (2011b).
93. Catalan (2010), (2011b).
CHART 6 ▪ SEAT’s a brand output in Spain, 1953-2015
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Ibiza, a model conceived when the firm was completely state-owned, would 
remain the brand’s blockbuster for nearly 30 years.94
The government of  Felipe González signed an agreement in June 1986 to 
sell 51% of Seat’s capital to Volkswagenwerk A.G.95 Moreover, the contract 
also stated that Wolfsburg’s group would increase its share to 75% at the end 
of  the year. The Spanish socialist government also agreed to assume any past 
debt from Seat. It has been calculated that for the Spanish tax payer the total 
cost of  Seat’s privatization (including previous subsidies) was nearly 2,000 
million euro. On the other hand, VW agreed to invest some 3,000 million euro 
in SEAT and to maintain the company as an independent brand with its own 
distribution network.96
In 1980, Daimler Benz took full control of  Mevosa, formerly Elizalde. 
The following year, the name of the company was changed to Mercedes-Benz 
España. The Vitoria and Barcelona plants were restructured to prepare for 
the launch of  the MB 100 van, which would become an export success in the 
late 1980s. Whereas the Basque plant assembled the van, the Catalan factory 
produced the engines, the gear boxes and other parts.97
The prospect of  a low-cost country entering the EEC also encouraged an 
increase of  foreign investment in part manufacturers in the Barcelona cluster. 
For instance, Condiesel, the manufacturer of  diesel fuel pumps established in 
Sant Cugat, was renamed Lucas (the brand name of the major stakeholder). 
In 1985, the brakes manufacturer located in Parets (which was founded by Ri-
cart and his partners as Automoción S.A.) changed its name to Bendix Es-
paña, to clearly show that it was a subsidiary of  the American company.
Most of  the Barcelona cluster recovered during the second half  of  the 
1980s. The expectations due to Spain’s adherence to the Common Market in 
1986, and the world recovery that took place after the stagflation crisis com-
bined to favor a new period of  expansion in the manufacture of  automobiles 
and their parts in the Catalan district. During this phase, the Barcelona hub-
firms tended to adopt growth strategies characterized by three main features: 
externalization, product innovation and specialization.98 
Externalization became a strategy to decrease both inventory and labor 
costs. The aim was to imitate the success of Japanese manufacturers, and Toyo-
ta in particular, with its just-in-time system. An indicator of the intensity of 
such a process is the ratio of employment generated by the cluster’s top ten 
firms. In 1976 they generated 78% of the employment in the cluster (55,131 
94. Solé (1994); Llorente (1997); Díaz Ruiz (2010); Catalan (2011b).
95. Solé (1994).
96. Llorente (1997).
97.  Catalan (2006a).
98.  Llorente (1997); Catalan (2000); González de la Fe (2003); Díaz Ruiz (2010); Cata-
lan (2011b).
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people) (Table 3). In 1989 their share had fallen to just 58% (whereas total em-
ployment in the cluster was rather similar, at about 55,202 people) (Table 5). 
Product innovation was also crucial at a time when the Spanish consum-
er could choose from a much wider range of  products at a better price, as a 
member of the EEC. Seat launched the Ibiza model in 1984, and also present-
ed new passenger cars in 1985 (the Málaga) and 1990 (the Toledo), all de-
signed by Giuggiaro in collaboration with the R&D center in Martorell and 
manufactured in the Zona Franca.99 Moreover, Seat marketed both Volkswa-
gen and Audi models, particularly the Polo, which was produced in Seat’s 
plant in Pamplona. Nissan Motor Ibérica presented the four-wheel-drive 
model Nissan Patrol, which began to be produced in Barcelona’s Zona Fran-
ca in 1983. The following year, it launched the Vanette van. In 1988, the for-
mer Motor Ibérica presented another van (Nissan Trade), a new light truck 
(Nissan) and improved the engines of  its Patrol and commercial models.100 
Specialization was a requirement in large markets, such as the West-Eu-
ropean one. Seat found its niche as the cheap, Mediterranean brand of  the 
Volkswagen group. Nissan prioritized the production of four-wheel-drive ve-
hicles, vans and light trucks, but scaled down its capacity to manufacture heavy 
trucks, agricultural tractors, truck tractors and buses. It succeeded in getting 
the lion’s share of  the 4x4 market in Spain. Mercedes Benz used its Barcelo-
na plant to supply parts for its Vitoria factory.101 Enasa stopped its produc-
tion of  vans and light trucks, and tried to concentrate on heavy trucks, truck 
tractors and buses. 
The 1990-95 slump interrupted recovery. The outbreak of  the First Gulf 
War, moderately, and the collapse of  the European Monetary System, in a 
more dramatic way, sank Spain into a new crisis. Among the automobile pro-
ducers, Enasa was the firm that first experienced the slump, suffering a tre-
mendous erosion of  market share: the output of  its blockbuster, the Pegaso 
heavy truck, fell from 6,300 units in 1988 to 2,900 in 1990. INI decided to pri-
vatize the firm, which was bought by Iveco, a subsidiary of  Fiat. 
Seat also suffered a dramatic slump, which reached its nadir in 1993, when 
nearly 1,000 million euros of  losses were recorded in one year. The Volkswa-
gen consortium had built a new plant in Martorell, which cost around 4,000 
million euros and was mainly financed by credit. Spain had joined the EMS 
with a very optimistic parity of  65 pesetas per Deutschmark. Funds were bor-
rowed in marks without exchange insurance.102 When Spain was unable to 
maintain its parity in late 1992 and its currency began to depreciate, the cost 
 99.  Catalan (2011b).
100. Echevarría & Voltes (1990).
101. Barrientos (coord.) (2003).
102. Solé (1994); González de la Fe (2003).
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of servicing the loan went up.103 However, the main reason for the dramatic 
losses was that Martorell launched its first cars when European demand was 
dropping. Seat experienced dramatic over-production through its three plants 
in the Barcelona cluster (the old Zona Franca factory, the new Martorell 
plant, and a gear box factory in Prat del Llobregat) and its Pamplona/Land-
aben plant (mainly for VW products).104
Nissan opened a new R&D center in Barcelona in 1990 (the second in the 
district, after Seat’s Martorell center). In 1992, it launched a new compact 
people carrier, assembled in its Zona Franca plant: the Nissan Serena. How-
ever, the Japanese subsidiary was also hurt by the dramatic contraction of de-
mand for its light trucks and vans. These were also tough times for Mercedes, 
whose Spanish output of  vans fell from 28,000 units in 1991 to only 19,000 
in 1993. 
During the slump of 1990-95, the hub-firms in the Barcelona cluster con-
tinued with their previous strategies of  innovating and increasing specializa-
tion. Externalization came to a temporary halt due to the need to use a huge, 
underutilized capacity. Moreover, the leading cluster companies tried to in-
103. Llorente (1997).
104. Catalan (2001b).
TABLE 5 ▪ Employment by leading firms and total employment in the automobile 
industry cluster of Barcelona 
1989 2010
SEAT 18,200 SEAT 10,369
Nissan Motor Ibérica 4,500 Nissan Motor Ibérica 4,500
Bendix España 2,047 Gearbox del Prat 1,085
Lucas Automotive 1,212 Delphi 1,052
IVECO-PEGASO 1,200 Fico Mirrors Barcelona 939
Mercedes Benz 1,000 Centro Técnico SEAT 918
FICOSA International 976 Doga 845
MAHLE 917 Plastal 777
Valeo Térmico 960 Kostal Eléctrica 750
FAESPA 850 Magneti Marelli España 700
31,862 21,935
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
IN THE DISTRICT 55,202
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
IN THE DISTRICT 44,304
SHARE OF 10
TOP FIRMS 0.577
SHARE OF 10
TOP FIRMS 0.495
Source: Own work from Solà, Hernández & López (1990) and Actualidad Económica (2012), Cuáles son, cuánto 
venden y quien manda en las primeras 5.000 empresas de España, Iberform, Madrid.
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crease flexibility by splitting some of  their subsidiaries. Nissan Spain was di-
vided into several companies, including Nissan Motor Ibérica (design and pro-
duction of  light vehicles and engines), Nissan Vehículos Industriales (trucks) 
and Nissan Distribution Service Barcelona (logistics). In addition to the R&D 
center, Barcelona kept two production plants in Zona Franca (where the Ter-
rano, Patrol, Serena and Vanette Cargo models were assembled) and Mont-
cada (body parts production). 
In Barcelona, Iveco ended its heavy truck manufacturing (which contin-
ued in Madrid only) and specialized in buses and parts. Some of the cluster’s 
plants were transformed into Componentes Mecánicos S.A. to focus on the 
manufacture of  gear boxes. This was a joint venture of  Iveco with ZF Frie-
drichshafen A.G.. Seat transferred its Pamplona/Landaben plant and some 
of its previous branches (financing, leasing and a few European agencies) to 
the Volkswagen consortium. Wolfsburg also centralized the buying of  parts 
for the whole group and, under the leadership of  Ferdinand Piech, imple-
mented a policy of  common platforms for the main brands of  the consorti-
um. The number of  main brands had increased to four with the acquisition 
of  Skoda, the Czech company.105
105. Solé (1994); Llorente (1997); González de la Fe (2003); Díaz Ruiz (2010); Cata-
lan (2011b).
CHART 7 ▪ Output of Motor Ibérica/Nissan in Spain, 1977-2010 (vehicles, agrarian 
tractors excluded)
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The dramatic crises of the Seat brand, whose sales decreased from 362,360 
vehicles in 1990 to only 290,155 units in 1993 (when a new 500,000-unit capac-
ity plant had been opened), led Piech to ask for the support of the Spanish gov-
ernment. After some bargaining, the Instituto de Crédito Oficial lent 240 mil-
lion euros and the Catalan regional government an additional 50 million euros 
to restructure Seat’s Zona Franca facility. In exchange, the local political actors 
required the VW group’s commitment to increase the share of Spanish domes-
tic parts that Seat used in its vehicles. The share had decreased to 53% through-
out the 1980s and early 1990s. The agreement stated that the share should in-
crease to a minimum of 67%. This bargaining can be interpreted as a partial 
return to the policy of supporting local production, which had been abandoned 
since 1972.106 In some respects, there was some path dependence in Spanish in-
dustrial policy in the very long-term. The sustained depreciation of the peseta 
from 1992 onwards helped VW to increase its purchases in Spain. An exchange 
of 85 pesetas per Deutschmark at the end of 1995 made it much easier to ac-
quire parts for Seat’s vehicles in Spain than four years earlier.
After substantial and repeated revisions of  the peseta’s parity in the Eu-
ropean Monetary System, the Spanish economy experienced a new period of 
106. Catalan (2011b).
TABLE 6 ▪ Main producers of automobiles in 2000 and 2012 (thousands) 
2000 2012
1 United States 12,800 1 China 19,272
2 Japan 10,141 2 United States 10,329
3 Germany 5,563 3 Japan 9,943
4 France 3,348 4 Germany 5,649
5 South Korea 3,145 5 South Korea 4,562
6 Spain 3,033 6 India 4,145
7 Canada 2,962 7 Brazil 3,343
8 China 2,069 8 Mexico 3,002
9 Mexico 1,936 9 Canada 2,464
10 United Kingdom 1,814 10 Thailand 2,429
11 Italy 1,738 11 Russia 2,232
12 Brazil 1,682 12 Spain 1,979
13 Russia 1,206 13 France 1,968
14 Belgium 1,033 14 United Kingdom 1,577
15 India 801 15 Czech Republic 1,179
Source: Own work from OICA, Production Statistics, various years.
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expansion until 2000. This led to a new phase of  relative splendor of  the clus-
ter, which at the end of  the century approximately recovered the peak levels 
of  employment reached in the mid-1970s and around 1990. At the same time, 
Spain climbed to sixth position in the world rankings of  automobile manu-
facturers (Table 6).
The leading firms in the district again benefited from the growing exter-
nalization of  their production. Supplier parks were created on the outskirts 
of  Martorell and in Zona Franca, to facilitate the extension of  just-in-time 
processes.107 The Nissan R&D center in Barcelona presented new versions of 
the Terrano four-wheel-drive model, Serena compact vehicle and Vanette 
Cargo van. In 1997, it was separated from its parent company to be trans-
formed into the Nissan European Technology Center España. Seat, which 
had launched its Cordoba model in 1993 (the last to be designed by Giuggia-
ro), presented the Alhambra compact model in 1996 (which was exclusively 
manufactured in Portugal) and the Arosa super-mini in 1997 (which was pro-
duced by Wolfsburg and Martorell). However, Seat’s most successful model 
after the Ibiza was the Leon, which was launched in 1999. By this time, the 
company had hired a new Italian designer, Walter de Silva, who came from 
Alfa Romeo. Volkswagen tried to depart from the image of  Seat as a cheap 
car by accentuating its sports and Mediterranean features. A new design 
center was created in the Barcelona coastal town of Sitges, which, together 
with Seat’s R&D center in Martorell, employed over 2,000 engineers and tech-
nicians at the end of the twentieth century. In Seat vehicles manufactured in 
the Barcelona cluster, the proportion of local parts increased from 53% in 1993 
to 72% in 1999. Seat’s brand sales reached its zenith in 2000 (Chart 9).108
The records of  the Mercedes and Iveco plants in Barcelona were not com-
parable, but the production of  engines and coaches tended to expand in the 
last few years of  the century. Barcelona partially benefited from the success 
of  the Vito van and the Mercedes Benz Class V, both of  which were assem-
bled in Vitoria. The output of  coaches increased from only 200 units in 1994 
to over 1,500 units in 1999. Iveco and Renault created a joint venture to man-
ufacture coaches under the brand Irisbus in 1998. The following year, Renault 
and Nissan signed a strategic alliance by which the French company bought 
37% of the Japanese group’s capital. In 2000, Nissan began to manufacture 
the Almera Tino, its new compact vehicle. It was the first time that the sub-
sidiary had assembled a passenger car in Spain. By that time, the Barcelona 
automobile industry cluster employed nearly 50,000 people.
107. Llorente (1997); Díaz Ruiz (2010).
108. Catalan (2011b).
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Old age’s saturation, 2001-2015
In 2000, the rapid expansion of  Western economies associated with the 
diffusion of  technologies for processing and transmitting information col-
lapsed. The US Federal Reserve reduced interest rates to encourage recovery 
and boosted a bubble in real estate, which prolonged artificial euphoria in the 
Western world until 2007. In the meantime, China was experiencing a much 
healthier expansion based on rapid industrialization. Reforms undertaken 
since the 1980s (including substantial depreciation of the yuan) plus adhesion 
to the International Trade Organization in the early twenty-first century 
transformed the country into a world creditor. Since the burst of  the real es-
tate bubble in the US and Europe, China has climbed to first place in the 
world rankings of  automobile output (measured in number of  vehicles). Oth-
er Asian economies and a few Latin American and East European countries 
also rose in the rankings, following comparable industrialization strategies. 
In contrast, Spain dropped from sixth to twelfth position in 2012 (Table 6). 
The Barcelona automobile-industry cluster experienced accelerated aging.
The premature old age of  the cluster did not merit the attention of  many 
analysts before 2008, because Spain recorded one of  the most marked real es-
tate bubbles since the full adoption of  the euro. Spain’s adhesion to the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union led to a notable decrease in interest rate spread in 
CHART 8 ▪ The life cycle of the Barcelona automotive industry, 1955-2011  
(number of emloyees)
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Source: Own work from Catalan (2006 & 2011b) and IDESCAT (2013), “Persones ocupades a la indústria”,  
www.idescat.cat.
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relation to the main countries in the area, which encouraged import capital 
and growing indebtedness. The marked capital inflow contributed to eroding 
Spanish foreign competitiveness at a time when depreciation of  the currency, 
the traditional way to adjust, was barred. Such a process could rarely be de-
nied during the Great Recession which began in late 2007, but was hidden by 
the previous banking credit and real estate euphoria. In the meantime, mul-
tinational groups began to transfer production phases to Eastern Europe or 
even Asia, where labor costs were much lower. 
Seat’s share in its main market (Western Europe) increased from 2.3% in 
1990 to 2.9% in 2000, but fell to 2.4% in 2007.109 The collapse accelerated from 
then, and Seat’s market share in Western Europe stood at only 2.1% in 2012. 
The opposite pattern occurred with the other cheap brand in the Volkswagen 
consortium, Skoda. Its share in the same market increased from 1.5% in 2000 
to 3.1% in 2012. In 2009, Skoda surpassed Seat in sales on the former market, 
for the first time. This was particularly worrying because, in contrast with the 
Czech brand, the Volkswagen group did not make any substantial effort to 
promote its Barcelona subsidiary on other continents. VW’s strategy of  try-
ing to improve Seat’s image by strengthening its links with Audi rather failed. 
The brand’s most successful model was still, until 2013, its people’s vehicle, 
the Ibiza, which was first conceived when the firm was under local control 
and state-owned.110 Seat maintained its key position as the main hub-firm of 
the cluster, but its contribution to total employment in the district continued 
to decrease as externalization progressed.
In Barcelona, the manufacturing activity of  Mercedes-Benz and Iveco 
tended to decrease throughout the twenty-first century. The Stuttgart firm ex-
perienced stagnation in its Spanish output of vans, which has remained below 
75,000 units since 2000. The production of passenger cars performed a little 
better, with the manufacturing of the Viano model, but the German parent 
company decided to concentrate its Spanish activity in Vitoria. Similarly, the 
production of buses and coaches by Iveco substantially declined in the Barce-
lona district. In 1999, the output of the Italian company’s Catalan factory was 
about 1,500 coaches. This figure had dropped to 254 vehicles by 2010.
Nissan Motor Ibérica’s manufacturing activities had a more positive out-
look in the Barcelona cluster. The total production of  4x4 vehicles (including 
the Pathfinder and Navara models) increased from 45,000 units in 2000 to 
106,000 in 2007, but later dropped to just 19,000 in 2009. The output of  vans 
(which are also produced for Renault and Opel) rose from 41,000 in 1999 to 
86,000 in 2008, but fell to only 25,000 in 2009.
109. Catalan (2011b).
110. Solé (1994); Llorente (1997); Catalan (2010); Díaz Ruiz (2010); Catalan (2011b).
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Externalization within the parts suppliers of  the cluster continued during 
the twenty-first century. The share in employment of  the ten top firms de-
clined to only 49% in 2010 (Table 5). Moreover, the activity of  parts produc-
ers in the Barcelona cluster has tended to decrease since 2000. Most of  the 
manufacturers substantially cut their number of employees within the district, 
well before the official beginning of  the global financial crisis in 2007. More-
over, international groups such as Lear, Valeo, Eaton Livia and Delphi closed 
some of their Catalan plants during the first decades of  the twenty-first cen-
tury. Even Barcelona’s Ficosa group, which was founded in 1949 and has 
about 8,000 employees worldwide, decided to transfer some of their lower 
added value activities out of  the district.111 Nevertheless, this group, which is 
one of  the few under local control, maintains its R&D center in the cluster. 
It is also developing new technology in cooperation with Seat and Sanyo. Fi-
cosa together with the windshield washers’ manufacturer Doga and the main 
assemblers of  the district, has contributed to the creation of  a new specific 
institution within the cluster, the Ciac (see main text below).
In short, the Spanish automobile industry as a whole, and the Barcelona 
district in particular, has declined significantly since 2000, with marked un-
111. Catalan (2006b).
TABLE 7 ▪ Main producers of automobiles in 2012 and 2015 (thousands) 
2012 2015
1 China 19,272 1 China 24,503
2 United States 10,329 2 United States 12,100
3 Japan 9,943 3 Japan 9,278
4 Germany 5,649 4 Germany 6,033
5 South Korea 4,562 5 South Korea 4,556
6 India 4,145 6 India 4,126
7 Brazil 3,343 7 Mexico 3,565
8 Mexico 3,002 8 Spain 2,733
9 Canada 2,464 9 Brazil 2,429
10 Thailand 2,429 10 Canada 2,283
11 Russia 2,232 11 France 1,970
12 Spain 1,979 12 Thailand 1,915
13 France 1,968 13 U K 1,682
14 U K 1,577 14 Russia 1,394
15 Czech Republic 1,179 15 Czech Republic 1,304
Source: Own work from OICA, Production Statistics, various years.
16849_RHI66.indb   114 27/2/17   15:06
Jordi Catalan
115
derperformance in relation to Eastern Europe and Asia. Foreign control of 
key manufacturers and suppliers within the cluster has had a negative influ-
ence in the era of  ‘de-location’. However, there are a few reasons for not be-
ing too pessimistic. The worst moment of  recession was 2012. Since then, re-
covery began to take place both in Barcelona and Spain. Spanish production 
jumped from less than 2 million vehicles in 2012 to 2.7 million in 2015. Spain’s 
place in the world ranking of  producers improved again from twelfth in 2012 
to eighth position in 2015 (Table 7).
Seat’s output also began to recover. The production of Seat’s models in 
Martorell rose from 270,514 units in 2012 to 342,907 in 2015.112 Moreover, the 
output of the Catalan plant included 134,170 units of Audi’s Q3 model. Seat’s 
market share in Western Europe’s new registration of passenger cars expanded 
again from 2.1% in 2012 to 2.4% in 2015 (see Chart 9).113 Last but not least, the 
Leon model, a higher spec added value category vehicle than the Ibiza model, 
has replaced the latter as the main blockbuster product of the firm.
Nissan Motor Ibérica is assembling around 130,000 vehicles per year in 
Barcelona. Its output includes Navara 4x4 and pickup models. In 2015 a new 
112. SEAT, Informe Anual, various years.
113. ACEA, New registrations in Western Europe (EU15+EFTA). 
CHART 9 ▪ SEAT share in Western Europe’s new registration of passenger cars, 1990-
2015
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model, Pulsar, with an output of  36,000 units was launched. The Japanese 
company allied with Renault is also assembling its NV200 van in its plant in 
Barcelona’s Zona Franca, including a promising electric version.
A few firms joined forces and finally the Automotive Industry Cluster of 
Catalonia (CIAC) was created in April 2013. The five founding companies 
were the two main assemblers (Seat and Nissan) and three part producers of 
local origin (Ficosa, Doga and Gestamp). Since then, more than 150 firms 
established in the region have joined the Ciac. Barcelona’s cluster manufac-
tures more than half  a million vehicles per year and it is still the main auto-
motive-industry district in Spain, with a share of  more than 20% in number 
of  vehicles produced.114
Conclusions
The life-cycle of Barcelona’s automobile industry cluster has lasted more 
than a century. Spain, which was only a marginal automobile producer until 
1950, had climbed to sixth place in the world rankings by 2000, mainly due to 
the development of this cluster. In spite of growing maturity, the Barcelona 
cluster has succeeded in maintaining its position as leader among the Spanish 
automobile districts up to now. During the last few decades of the twentieth 
century, the Barcelona automobile cluster did not experience a decline as 
marked as that of Detroit in the USA or the West Midlands in Britain.
There are four key reasons for the relative success of  the Barcelona clus-
ter, in the following order of  importance: externalities; strategic policy; hub-
firm capabilities; and institutions. The main reason for the good performance 
of  the cluster in the long term was the set of  externalities created in the Cat-
alan capital, which were mainly of  a Marshallian type. Previous to the foun-
dation of  Hispano-Suiza in 1904, there were at least six attempts to construct 
cars in Barcelona. Before Elizalde began to produce cars in 1915, it had been 
manufacturing parts since 1909. Before Ford decided to transfer its Spanish 
plant to Barcelona in 1923, the Dearborn firm had been assembling cars in 
Cadiz, with very poor results. Similarly, in 1948 Fiat supported the creation 
of  SEAT in Barcelona because it could rely on specialized suppliers that were 
based there, a qualified labor force and the diffuse knowledge of  the automo-
bile industry. Recoveries after the stagflation crises and the early 1990s slump 
were also favored by the fact that the automobile builders in the cluster could 
externalize production phases to their suppliers in the district.
The second key cause of  the satisfactory performance of  the Barcelona 
cluster was the adoption of  strategic policy. Previously to the Civil War, tax 
114. ANFAC (2016), Informe anual 2015, Madrid.
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rebates forced Ford to increase its use of  local parts. Under Franco, success 
in mass production was due to the creation of  SEAT, which was a joint ven-
ture between public and private capital. SEAT was, in fact, the firm that re-
ally placed Spain among the ten top world producers of  cars. The political 
project that led to its creation not only attempted to undertake mass produc-
tion of  cars, but also wanted to promote the use of  locally produced parts. As 
a result, the first people’s car in Spain, the Model 600, used more than 90% 
locally produced parts. This favored tremendous expansion in the Barcelona 
cluster during the golden age after the Second World War. Similarly, after the 
early 1990s crises, a deal was agreed with Volkswagen to increase the use of 
domestically produced parts, bringing SEAT’s use of  local parts from 53 to 
72% between 1995 and 1999.
The emergence of  hub-firms, which performed as leaders of  the district, 
can be considered the third reason for success. Hispano-Suiza and Elizalde 
provided the cluster with organizational capabilities in the fields of  R&D, 
production and marketing. Ford was able to benefit from economies of  scale 
in production by introducing assembly lines for the first time in the district. 
The three firms also trained a labor force and created a network of  suppliers 
before 1936. The legacy of  these hub-firms contributed to the future achieve-
ments of  their successors: Enasa, Enmasa and Motor Ibérica under Franco’s 
regime, and Iveco, Mercedes Benz and Nissan afterwards. All of  these com-
panies can be considered successful spin-offs of  the pioneering hub-firms. As 
a result of these firms, the cluster could produce a considerable range of prod-
ucts: passenger cars, buses, vans, light and heavy trucks and four-wheel-drive 
vehicles. However, it should be stressed that the triumph of mass production 
was the responsibility of  a newcomer: Seat. This company was not a spin-off, 
but the result of  adopting a nationalist policy.
Institutions also mattered, even if  they were the least significant factor. 
In the beginning, local institutions, inherited from the successful First Indus-
trial Revolution in Catalonia, helped to train technicians and qualify em-
ployees. A very significant role was performed by the Industrial Engineering 
School of  Barcelona, which was the only one of  its type that had survived at 
the end of  the nineteenth century in Spain. Another important institution 
was the Automobile Exhibition of  Barcelona, which officially took place for 
the first time in 1919. Before the Civil War, the Exhibition hosted more than 
400 local and international exhibitors. However, Franco’s regime substan-
tially weakened Catalan local institutions. Regional government came to an 
end. Enasa (formerly Hispano-Suiza), Enmasa (formerly Elizalde) and Seat 
located their headquarters outside the cluster, in Madrid. The Automobile 
Exhibition of  Barcelona did not open its doors again until 1966, which 
meant that between its seventh and eighth editions there was a gap of  over 
30 years. In spite of  such a dramatic weakening of  local institutions, the clus-
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ter experienced a sustained renaissance between the late 1950s and the early 
1970s. 
The Barcelona cluster experienced a marked long-term decline during the 
start of  the twenty-first century. From 2000, both manufacturers and part 
suppliers recorded sustained decreases in output and losses in employment. 
This coincided with the adoption of  the European single currency, which led 
to the reduction of interest rates, growing indebtedness, increasing capital im-
ports and, as a result, the erosion of  competitiveness. 
The worst moment of  the Great Recession for Spain was the year 2012, 
when its automotive industry dropped to twelfth position in the world rank-
ings of  automobile producers, as a result of  the burst of  the bubble, heavy in-
debtedness and the adoption of  excessively restrictive macroeconomic poli-
cies. Later recovery began and Spain climbed newly to eighth position in 2015. 
The Barcelona cluster also recorded a significant improvement. It is still the 
main Spanish automotive-industry district and produces again more than 
half  million vehicles per year. The cluster is also experiencing some institu-
tional renewal with the creation of  the CIAC, which coordinates around 150 
firms located in the Barcelona automotive-industry district.
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■
The Life-Cycle of  the Barcelona Automobile-Industry Cluster, 1889-2015
aBstRaCt
The life-cycle of  Barcelona’s automobile industry cluster has lasted more than a century. 
The main reason for the good performance of  the cluster in the long term was the externalities 
created within the district, which were mainly of  a Marshallian type. The second key cause of 
its satisfactory performance was the adoption of  strategic policy. The emergence of  hub-firms, 
which performed as leaders of  the district, can be considered the third reason for success. In-
stitutions also mattered, even if  they were the least significant factor.
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■
El ciclo vital del clúster de la industria de la automoción de Barcelona, 1889-
2015
ResuMen
El ciclo vital del clúster de la industria de la automoción en Barcelona ha durado más de 
un siglo. La principal razón de su exitosa trayectoria a largo plazo residió en las externalidades 
de tipo marshalliano que emergieron en el seno del distrito. La segunda clave del éxito fue la 
adopción de políticas industriales estratégicas. La aparición de empresas líderes en el distrito 
potenció los anteriores factores. En cambio, las instituciones, aunque también desempeñaran 
un papel positivo, constituyeron la causa menos significativa del éxito.
PalaBRas Clave: Industria del automóvil, clústeres, distritos, políticas estratégicas, Bar-
celona
Códigos Jel: N63, N64, O14, 025, L52, L62
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